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ABSTRACT 
We examine the stability of international environmental policy schemes when sovereign 
nations set policies to control both greenhouse gas emissions and traditional air 
pollutants.  An international environmental policy scheme is defined to be stable if no 
country can obtain higher payoffs under other international environmental policy 
schemes.  We show that when regional transnational air pollution damages are large 
relative to climate change damages, there are many efficient and stable international 
environmental policy schemes in which all nations belong to coalitions, the coalitions are 
completely interconnected and the income transfers promoted within all coalitions follow 
the Nash bargaining formula. 
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Recent scientific evidence shows that mitigating greenhouse gases and controlling 
air pollutants are two closely related tasks. 1  Many greenhouse gases and air 
pollutants share common sources and hence changes in the activity levels of these 
sources affect both types of pollutants. Consider the burning of fossil fuels, which 
is not only the largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, but also generates high 
emissions of traditional air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, 
volatile organic compounds and particulate matter. It follows that enhanced fuel 
efficiency can reduce both types of pollutants. The linkage between the two types 
of pollutants is also observed in abatement spillovers, in the sense that technical 
measures of abatement aiming at reducing one type of pollutant may reduce or 
increase the other type of pollutant. For instance, selective catalytic reduction 
(SCR) on gas boilers reduces both methane – a greenhouse gas – and nitrogen 
oxides (EEA, 2004).  
Both greenhouse gases and conventional air pollutants cause transnational 
environmental damages. Greenhouse gases emitted by every country add to the 
atmospheric concentration of these gases and lead to global warming. Hence, 
international coordination of sovereign nations is needed to tackle climate change. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, which entered into force in 2005, the industrialized member 
countries commit to meeting their greenhouse gas emission reduction targets over 
the period of 2008-2012.  Air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, 
volatile organic compounds and particulate matter can travel far from their 
original source with prevailing winds and lead to transboundary acid rain, ground 
level ozone, or smog problems in many regions of the world. International 
environmental agreements (IEAs) have been formed around the globe to mitigate 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., IPCC (2001), EEA (2004), Bollen et al. (2009), and Defra (2010).   
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transboundary air pollutions. For example, the Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), which entered into force in 1983, 
together with eight subsequent protocols to the Convention, aims to reduce sulfur 
dioxide emissions, nitrogen oxides emissions and other transboundary air 
pollutants in countries in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE) region. In North America, Canada and the United States signed in 1991 
the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement to deal with transboundary acid 
rain problems. The two countries signed the Ozone Annex to the Agreement in 
2000 to reduce ground-level ozone. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that a Pareto efficient climate change 
mechanism requires the participation and cooperation of all countries emitting 
greenhouse gases.
2
 The uncertainty of whether the Kyoto Protocol or a protocol 
beyond 2012 can achieve broad participation of major emitting countries, the 
correlated global warming and transboundary air pollution problems, and the 
formation of many IEAs for transboundary air pollution issues led Silva and Zhu 
(2011) to explore the potential of international environmental mechanisms for the 
efficient control of both greenhouse gases and transboundary air pollution, 
without requiring the formation of a fully participated grand coalition for climate 
change.
3
 The authors consider coalition structures in which all nations belong to 
at least one IEA, there is no IEA containing all nations and there is complete 
interconnection among distinct IEAs. The authors demonstrate that national 
environmental policy making in a Nash non-cooperative manner can lead to 
Pareto efficiency if followed by proportionally equitable international income 
transfers within all coalitions. There is a large set of efficient international policy 
                                                          
2
 See, e.g., Caplan et al. (2003), for a discussion on the efficiency of an international carbon dioxide emissions permit 
market without global participation. 
3
 See, e.g., Caplan and Silva (2005) and Silva and Zhu (2009), for efficient international environmental mechanisms that 
control both greenhouse gases and air pollution. 
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arrangements featuring coalitions with fewer than the total number of nations and 
producing national payoffs identical to those produced by the efficient grand 
coalition.  
Due to the lack of supranational authorities with coercive power, the success 
of these efficient international mechanisms controlling both climate change and 
air pollution hinges on the voluntary participation and compliance of the 
sovereign nations. In providing the global public good of mitigating climate 
change, free riding incentives may prevail and lead individual countries to defect 
from an efficient mechanism. The task of the current paper is to go beyond the 
efficiency issue to investigate the stability of these efficient coalition structures.  
Before we present our notion of stability of an international environmental 
mechanism, we identify two different notions of stability in the literature on the 
formation of IEAs: internal-external stability and  -core stability. According to 
the  -core concept that originates from cooperative game theory, a coalition lies 
in the  -core of an IEA game if any individual country or group of countries 
cannot obtain higher payoffs deviating from the coalition. In face of deviation, the 
other coalition members will give up cooperation completely and choose their 
individual emission abatement strategies in a Nash non-cooperative manner. This 
strand of the IEA literature considers asymmetric countries and shows that the 
efficient grand coalition can be stable with implementation of international 
income transfer schemes (e.g., Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997, 2006; 
Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003). Another strand of the IEA literature initiated by 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) uses the stability concept 
developed by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) for cartel formation in a non-cooperative 
game framework.
4
 A coalition is said to be stable if it is internally stable – no 
coalition member has an incentive to deviate, and externally stable – no outsider 
                                                          
4
 See, e.g., Finus (2008), for a recent review of both strands of the literature. 
4 
 
has an incentive to join the coalition. It is assumed that all countries are identical 
and that the coalition members cooperatively choose their abatement strategies to 
maximize collective welfare after they make membership decisions non-
cooperatively. When defection occurs, the remaining coalition members will keep 
cooperation under the coalition. This branch of research shows that the grand 
coalition which would generate large welfare gains compared with a Nash non-
cooperative situation is generally not likely to be stable.  More recently, authors 
like Eyckmans and Finus (2003) show that stable coalition structures with 
multiple and non-overlapping IEAs can perform better in terms of welfare and 
abatement levels than a single coalition.  
A key difference in the modeling between these two strands of research is 
how a deviator expects the other coalition members will respond to its defection. 
The  -core theory assumes that a potential deviator expects the other members 
will break into singletons. This expectation of losing cooperation completely and 
entering the Nash equilibrium deters deviation and is inductive to the stability of 
the grand coalition. The d’Aspremont stability assumes that the other members 
will stay in the coalition and reduce emissions as a group.  The grand coalition is 
hence usually unstable because a country can see a higher payoff generated by 
free riding on other countries’ emission abatement efforts. Instead of placing such 
exogenous assumptions on the reactions of other coalition members, a number of 
researchers have introduced the idea of farsightedness into the IEA stability 
analysis.
 5
 When a country considers deviating from an IEA, it can fully foresee 
how the other countries may respond even at many steps away and what 
equilibrium coalition structures may emerge from its defection. The country 
makes decision by comparing its status quo welfare with welfare under potential 
                                                          
5
 See, among others, Chwe (1994), Mariotti (1997), Xue (1998) and Mariotti and Xue (2003) for the notion of farsighted 
stability in abstract settings. 
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final equilibrium outcomes. Chander (2003) shows if countries are farsighted, 
they will indeed break into singletons in response to deviation as suggested by the 
 -core assumption and the grand coalition is farsightedly stable. Eyckmans 
(2001), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002), and Osmani and Tol (2009) 
demonstrate that farsighted stable coalitions with either identical or asymmetric 
players can achieve higher welfare and environmental quality than the 
d’Aspremont stable coalitions with myopic countries.  
Our approach to the IEA stability issue differs from the previous work in three 
significant ways. First, we do not require countries to be either myopic or 
farsighted; or if countries are myopic, we do not impose an exogenous coalition 
structure at the next step of deviation.  Accordingly, we define a coalition 
structure as a stable one if any individual country, or group of countries, could not 
find itself better off under any other coalition structures. This notion is essentially 
one of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium which accounts for both individual and 
group rationality. We explore conditions under which an efficient coalition 
structure is stable in this sense. Without making assumptions on how other 
countries react to deviation, the stable coalition structures identified by us satisfy 
the d’Aspremont stability,  -core stability and farsighted stability. 
 Secondly, we take into account policy making on both global climate change 
(i.e., global warming) and regional transnational air pollution (i.e., acid rain). As 
we will demonstrate, concerns over regional transnational air pollution problems 
can greatly impact a nation’s deviation decision. When a nation considers 
defecting from an efficient coalition structure, it has to weigh the benefits of free 
riding on other countries’ greenhouse gas emission reductions against the losses 
due to higher continental air pollution. It is indeed the joint policy making to 
reduce global and regional pollution damages that overcomes the free riding 
incentives in fighting climate change and allows an efficient coalition structure to 
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be stable. Without taking into account regional transnational damages, it is hard 
for an efficient coalition structure such as the grand coalition to be stable in the 
d’Aspremont sense. 
Thirdly, unlike Eyckmans and Finus (2003), we allow the formation of 
multiple IEAs with overlapped members, which enables us to derive a set of many 
efficient and stable coalition structures. The connectedness property of the 
efficient and stable coalition structures, which is the requirement that each player 
to be linked directly or indirectly to every other player, is fundamental. It enables 
the benefits of regional policy coordination to be fully incorporated into the 
analysis of the costs and benefits of global policy coordination.  
We show that the efficiency results of Silva and Zhu (2011) hold when the 
payoff function of the income-transfer agency of a coalition follows the Nash 
bargaining form. We find that the stability of an efficient coalition structure 
depends on the relative magnitude of damages caused by regional (i.e., 
continental) air pollution and global climate change. When continental air 
pollution damages are large, a country may find it not profitable to deviate from 
an efficient coalition structure and act as a singleton because it will lose the 
benefits of reducing continental air pollution and the loss caused by increased 
continental air pollution outweighs the benefits of free riding on other countries’ 
greenhouse gas emissions abatement.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds the basic model. Section 3 
describes eight international environmental policy schemes. Section 4 discusses 
the stability of the efficient coalition structures. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. The Basic Model 
Consider a world consisting of four identical nations indexed 4,...,1i and 
two regions, North America and Europe. Nations 1 and 2 are located in North 
America and nations 3 and 4 are located in Europe. Normalizing the population in 
each country to unity, we write the representative consumer’s utility in nation  i  
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as   2 2i i i iu x v e a sg    , where  ix , ie , ia and g  are respectively quantities 
consumed of a numeraire good, energy, acidic deposition and a greenhouse gas. 
The consumer’s benefit from energy consumption is denoted   ,
2
iii cebeev 
where b  and c  are positive parameters and we will have more discussions on the 
values of b  and c  later.   We assume that one unit of energy consumption leads 
to one unit of sulfur dioxide emissions and one unit of emissions of the 
greenhouse gas. The sulfur emissions flow in both directions across the borders of 
the USA and Canada and of the two European nations.  
Let the parameter  denote the fraction of nation j ’s sulfur emissions that 
deposit in nation ,j .2,1j  The fraction of nation j ’s sulfur emissions that travel 
to nation j  in the same region is hence 1 . Total sulfur depositions received 
by nation j  are represented by the sum of its own sulfur depositions and sulfur 
spillovers from nation j  in the same region, i.e., ,)1( jjj eea   ,2,1j
1 j if 2j  and vice-versa. Similarly, total sulfur depositions received by 
nation k  is  1k k ka e e     , 3,4k  , 3k   if 4k   and vice-versa. For 
symmetry, we assume that 1 2   and hence   22121 eeaa  and








ieg   
The parameter  1,0s  is a sensitivity index, which measures how sensitive 
each nation is to the damage caused by climate change. Given the quantities of the 
emissions generated, the parameter s  measures the relative magnitude of acid rain 
damage and climate change damage to a nation. For example, in any symmetric 
equilibrium, ,eae ii   1,..,4i  , and 4g e . Hence, the damage caused by acid 
rain to nation i  is 2 2ia e . The damage caused by climate change to nation i  is 
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2 216sg se . Thus, if 1 16s  , the damage caused by acid rain is equal to the 
damage caused by climate change to each nation. If 1 8s  , the greenhouse gas is 
twice harmful than acid rain.
6
 We can therefore also refer to s  as the damage-
relativity index. We shall show below that the value of s  is very important in 
determining the stability of the international environmental policy schemes.  
3. International Environmental Policy Schemes 
To identify stable international environmental policy schemes, we consider 
eight policy settings: setting 0, ({1},{2},{3},{4}); setting 1, ({1,2},{3,4}); setting 
2, ({1,2},{3},{4}); setting 3, ({1,3},{2,4}); setting 4, ({1,3},{2},{4}); setting 5, 
({1,2,3},{4}); setting 6, ({1,2,3,4}); setting 7, ({1,2},{2,3},{3,4}). We will show 
that settings 6 and 7 produce Pareto efficient allocations of world resources and 
settings 0 – 5 lead to inefficient allocations. Settings 0 – 5 represent all the 
inefficient policy schemes, because the inefficient policy schemes that are not 
included are “redundant” in the sense that each has an allocation that is identical 
to the allocation of one of settings 0 – 5 provided that the maximization problem 
solved by each coalition of two or more players has a unique solution. Consider, 
                                                          
6 Keeping uncertainties of monetizing the impacts of climate change and air pollution in mind, let us take the US and EU as 
examples to gain some idea of the relative magnitude of the damages. An analysis by Chestnut and Mills (2005) of the US 
Acid Rain Program established by Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments estimates annual benefits of the 
program in 2010 at $122 billion in 2000 US dollars. According to the Second Perspective Report by the US EPA (2011), 
the benefits of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments of reducing nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, volatile organic 
compounds and fine particles were estimated to reach almost $2 trillion in 2006 US dollars for the year 2020. In Nordhaus 
and Boyer (2000), the annual damage of a 2.5°C warming to the US was estimated to be $28 billion in 1990 dollars. For 
the EU, the health damages in 2020 due to baseline (2009) pollution of nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, ammonia, volatile 
organic compounds and fine particles were estimated by AEA Technology plc (2011) to have a median value of €474.112 
billion using the value of a life year (VOLY) approach based on PPP-adjusted UNECE average values in 2005 prices. 




for example, the policy scheme ({1,2},{2,3}, {4}). We will discuss in subsection 
3.6 that this policy scheme yields the same allocation as setting 5.  
Setting 0: No IEA Formed 
In this setting, the four nations act individually in a Nash non-cooperatively 
fashion. The budget constraint of the representative consumer in nation i  is  
wex ii  , ,4,...,1i                 (1a) 
where w  denotes national income and is assumed to be the same across nations.  
We can hence write nation i ’s numeraire consumption as ii ewx  , 4,...,1i . 
Taking energy consumption choices of all other countries as given, nation  ,j   
,2,1j chooses 0je   to maximize 













ijjj eseecebeew .                     (1b) 
Taking energy consumption choices of all other countries as given, nation  ,k
,4,3k chooses 0ke   to maximize 













ikkk eseecebeew .        (1c) 
The first order conditions for an interior solution to the maximization of (1a) and 
(1b) respectively are   
,2,1,212  jsgaceb jj
 
            (2a) 
.4,3,212  ksgaceb kk
 
                       (2b) 
Equations (2a) and (2b) inform us that each nation equalizes the marginal benefit 
and marginal cost of energy consumption when deciding on the amount of energy 
consumption in the nation. Without participating in any IEA, a nation’s marginal 
cost of energy consumption includes the amount of numeraire consumption the 




    Since ,21 aa   equations (2a) imply that 1 2e e and 1 2 2 1a a e e   . Similarly, 
equations (2b) imply that 3 4e e  and 3443 eeaa  . Equations (2a) and (2b) 
can hence be rewritten as 
  ,2,1,2112  jsgbec j
 
            (2c) 
  ,4,3,2112  ksgbec k
 
            (2d) 
which show that j ke e  and thus j ka a , 1,2j   and 3,4k  . Letting ia a , 
,4,...,1i we have a e  and  .4eg  Substituting these results into either 












 1,..,4i  ,                              (3a) 
where we use the superscript 0 to denote the value of a variable realized in the 
equilibrium in setting 0. The equilibrium quantity of greenhouse gas emissions 



























 1,..,4i  .              (3c) 
Equations (3a) inform us that 1b   ensures an interior solution in each 
maximization problem in setting 0. As we shall demonstrate below (in particular 
in subsection 3.6), 1b   and/or 2.3028c  ensure interior solutions in all 
international policy settings. Hence, we assume that 1b   and 2.3028c  in all 
settings. 
3.2 Setting 1: Continental Environmental Agreements 
Throughout the paper, we assume that each IEA has an agency in charge of 
promoting international income transfers. The income-transfer agencies’ payoff 
functions follow the Nash bargaining form and use 
0u as the status quo utility. 
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The income transfers are implemented after the nations make their energy 
consumption choices. We model the international environmental policy schemes 
in which IEAs are formed as two stage games with decentralized leadership, 
where the income-transfer agencies act as Stackelberg followers while the nations 
are assumed to be Stackelberg leaders in policy making. The equilibrium concept 
used for the two-stage games is subgame perfection. 
In setting 1, nations 1 and 2 form a continental environmental agreement in 
North America and nations 3 and 4 form a continental environmental agreement 
in Europe. Let it  denote the monetary transfer paid (if positive) or received (if 
negative) by nation i , .4,...,1i  We assume that 1 2 0t t  and .043  tt  
  The 
budget constraint of the representative consumer in nation i  is as follows: 
i i ix e w t   ,  ,4,...,1i               (4a) 
which allows us to express numeraire consumption in nation i  as i i ix w t e   , 
.4,...,1i  The utility of a representative consumer can hence be written as 
              






2 ,j j j j i
i
w t e e b ce e e s e

 
          
 
  1,2,j         (4b) 






2 , 3,4.k k k k i
i
w t e e b ce e e s e k

 
           
 
         (4c) 
 We solve the two-stage policy game by backward induction. Consider the 
second stage of the game. The payoff of the income-transfer agency in North 
America is     0 01 2 1 2,u u u u u u    and the payoff of the income-transfer 
agency in Europe is     0 03 4 3 4,u u u u u u    , where ,2,1, ju j is described 
by expression (4b) and ,4,3, kuk is described by expression (4c). Having 
observed the nations’ choices of energy consumption in the first stage of the game 
and given 1 2 1 2, , , ,e e a a g , the income-transfer agency in North America chooses 
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 1 2,t t  to maximize     0 01 2 1 2,u u u u u u    , subject to the income 
redistribution constraint .021  tt The first order conditions are 
   0 01 2 0u u u u     and .021  tt  Thus, 1 2u u  and 
        2122211211 ,211, eetcebecebeeet  .       (5a) 
Plugging equations (5a) into the national payoff functions (4b) implies that the 
transfers will lead both nations to maximize the average payoff function in North 
America as follows: 
    2 2 21 1 2 2 1 21 1 2 2w e b ce e b ce a a sg           .      (5b) 
In the first stage of the game, nation j , ,2,1j chooses 0je   to maximize (5b), 
taking every other nation’s choice of energy consumption as given. The first order 
condition for an interior solution is 
,4212 sgaceb jj  2,1j .          (6a) 
Since ,21 aa   equations (6a) imply that 1 2e e . Hence, 1 2 2 1a a e e   .  
Applying similar reasoning, the first order condition for an interior solution 
that governs the behavior of nation ,4,3, kk in the first stage is 
,4212 sgaceb kk  3,4k  .          (6b) 
With ,43 aa  equations (6b) imply that 3 4e e . Hence, 3 4 4 3a a e e   . Equations 
(6) tell us that with participation in a continental environmental agreement, a 
nation chooses energy consumption so that the marginal benefit of energy 
consumption equals the marginal cost of energy consumption which includes the 
amount of numeraire consumption the nation gives up and the marginal damages 
the two nations in the continental agreement suffer from acid rain and climate 
change. 
Combining equations (6a) and (6b), we find that j ke e  and thus j ka a ,








e e a a
c s

   
 
, ,4,...,1i         (7a) 
where we use the superscript “ *m ”  to denote the value of a variable realized in 
the equilibrium in setting .7,...,1, mm  We also obtain the following equilibrium 
























  1,..,4i  .         (7c)  
3.3 Setting 2: One Continental Environmental Agreement in North America   
Suppose that there is one continental environmental agreement in North 
America and the two European nations do not join any coalition. In this setting, 
the behavior of the income-transfer agency and the two countries in North 
America is the same as in setting 1.  
In the second stage of the game, the maximization problem of the income-
transfer agency in North America leads to 1 2u u  and equations (5a). 
In the first stage of the game, nation j , ,2,1j chooses 0je   to maximize 
(5b), and nation ,k ,4,3k chooses 0ke   to maximize (1c), taking energy 
consumption choices of other countries as given. The first order conditions for an 
interior solution are equations (6a) and (2b) respectively, which allow us to derive 
the following equilibrium values in setting 2: 
  









e jj         (8a) 
 
  









e kk         (8b) 
  














         




2 1 1 4 4 10 5 16 7 5 1
, 1,2,
2 1 2 1 8 3 2
j
c c s c c s c b
u w j
c c s c
        
   
     
     
     
(8d) 
       












wuk     
(8e) 
The assumptions ,1b 2.3028c  and  0,1s  ensure ,0*2 je .2,1j     
3.4 Setting 3: Two Bilateral Intercontinental Environmental Agreements 
Suppose now that there are two bilateral intercontinental environmental 
agreements, one formed by nations 1 and 3 and the other formed by nations 2 and 
4. Consider the bilateral agreement between nations 1 and 3. The payoff for the 
income-transfer agency of this agreement is     ., 030131 uuuuuu   Let 13t  
denote the monetary transfer paid (if positive) or received (if negative) by nation 
1. The budget constraints of the representative consumers in nations 1 and 3 can 
respectively be written as 
1 1 13x e w t   ,                 (9a) 
3 3 13x e w t   ,                 (9b) 
which allow us to write numeraire consumption in these two nations as 
1 13 1x w t e    and  3 13 3x w t e   , respectively. 
In the second stage of the game, having observed the nations’ choices of 
energy consumption in the first stage of the game and given 1 3 1 3, , , ,e e a a g , the 
income-transfer agency for nations 1 and 3 chooses 13t  to maximize 
     .11 0223331302211113 usgacebetwusgacebetw     
   
(10a) 




         .211,,, 23332111313113 acebeacebeaaeet      (10b) 
Plugging equation (10b) into the national payoff functions implies that both 
nations wish to maximize the following average payoff function: 
    2 2 21 1 3 3 1 31 1 2 2w e b ce e b ce a a sg           .     (10c) 
In the first stage of the game, nation ,h ,3,1h  chooses 0he  to maximize 
(10c), taking every other nation’s choice of energy consumption as given. 
Applying similar reasoning, it can be easily shown that nation ,l ,4,2l  chooses 
0le  in the first stage to maximize 
    2 2 22 2 4 4 2 41 1 2 2w e b ce e b ce a a sg           ,     (10d) 
taking all other nations’ energy consumption choices as given. The first order 
conditions for an interior solution to the nations’ maximization problems are 
  
,412 sgaceb ii    ,4,...,1i         (10e) 
which inform us that the marginal cost of energy consumption to a nation joining 
a bilateral environmental agreement equals the amount of numeraire consumption 
given up, the marginal damage the nation suffers from acid rain, and the marginal 
damage the two nations in the bilateral agreement suffer from climate change. 












































3.5 Setting 4: One Bilateral Intercontinental Environmental Agreement   
Consider the setting in which there is only one bilateral intercontinental 
environmental agreement formed by nations 1 and 3. In this setting, the behavior 
of nations 1 and 3 and their income-transfer agency is the same as in setting 3 
described in subsection 3.4.  
In the second stage of the game, the maximization problem of the income-
transfer agency leads to 1 3u u  and equation (10b). 
In the first stage of the game, nation ,h ,3,1h  chooses 0he  to maximize 
(10c), nation 2 chooses 02 e  to maximize (1b), and nation 4 chooses 04 e  to 
maximize (1c), taking energy consumption choices of other countries as given. 
The first order conditions for an interior solution are equations (10e) for nation ,h
,3,1h  equation (2a) for nation 2 and equation (2b) for nation 4. We thus derive 

















































eeaai           (12d) 













     ,3,1h      (12e) 













     .4,2l       (12f) 
                                                          
7
 Please see Appendix A for the derivation of equations (12a) and (12b). 
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Given our assumptions that ,1b 2.3028c  and  0,1s , we have ,0*4 he
.3,1h   
3.6 Setting 5: Trilateral Intercontinental Environmental Agreement 
Consider the setting in which there is a trilateral intercontinental 
environmental agreement formed by nations 1, 2 and 3. Nation 4 stays as a 
singleton. Let 0lt  denote the monetary transfer paid (if positive) or received (if 
negative) by nation ,l .3,2,1l  We assume that 1 2 3 0t t t   . The budget 
constraint of the representative consumer in nation ,l ,3,2,1l can be written as 
l l lx e w t   .                 (13) 
Hence, numeraire consumption in nation ,l ,3,2,1l is .lll etwx   
The payoff for the income-transfer agency of the trilateral agreement is 








l uuuuu where   ,1
22 sgacebetwu lllll   .3,2,1l  
In the second stage of the game, having observed the nations’ choices of energy 
consumption in the first stage of the game and given
 
 1 2 3 1 2 3, , , , , ,e e e a a a g , the 
income-transfer agency chooses  1 2 3, ,t t t  to maximize  1 2 3, ,u u u , subject to 
1 2 3 0t t t   . The solution is given by 1 2 3u u u   and the constraint on the 
transfers. Thus, we obtain:
 
 












    (14a) 
 












   
 (14b) 
 












    (14c)  
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Plugging equations (14) into the national payoff functions show that nation ,l
,3,2,1l wishes to maximize the following average payoff function: 
    2 2 2 2 2 2 21 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 31 3 3.w b e e e c e e e a a a sg                   (15) 
In the first stage of the game, nation ,l ,3,2,1l chooses 0le  to maximize 
(15), taking energy consumption choices of all other countries as given. The first 
order conditions for an interior solution are 
,6212 sgaceb jj  2,1j ,            (16a) 
sgaceb 612 33  .         (16b) 
Equations (16a) and (16b) inform us that the transfers implemented in the 
trilateral agreement motivate each member country of the agreement to internalize 
the externalities caused by the greenhouse gas emissions within the three 
countries. Equations (16a) tell us that the two countries in North America also 
fully internalize continental externalities caused by acid rain. 
The first order condition for an interior solution to the maximization problem 
solved by the stand alone nation 4 is described by equation (2b).  
Equations (16a) imply that .21 ee   Hence, 1 2 2 1a a e e    and
1 3 42g e e e   . Plugging these results and the fact that  3 4 3 4 2a a e e    into 
equations (16), we obtain the following equilibrium values in setting 5: 
  
  










     
 (17a)
 
     










          (17b) 
     










          (17c) 
  

























         (17e)   
         

















                     (17f)
 
         














    
(17g) 
Our assumption 2.3028c  originates from equation (17b), which says that 
0*53 e  for all  0,1s requires 1b  and 2.3028c  .  
Now consider the coalition structure ({1,2},{2,3},{4}). In this setting, there is 
a continental environmental agreement formed by nations 1 and 2 and a trans-
continental environmental agreement formed by nations 2 and 3. Our previous 
analysis of the international income transfers informs us that the income transfers 
promoted in the continental agreement will lead to 
21 uu   and the income 
transfers promoted in the trans-continental agreement will lead to .32 uu   Thus, 
321 uuu   and nations 1, 2 and 3 will be motivated to maximize the average 
payoff function of the three nations described by expression (15). The coalition 
structure ({1,2},{2,3},{4}) hence yields the same equilibrium allocation as the 
coalition structure ({1,2,3},{4}).  
3.7 Setting 6: the Grand Coalition 
If the Grand Coalition (GC) containing all four countries is formed, the budget 
constraint of the representative consumer in nation i  is 
i i ix e w t   ,  ,4,...,1i               (18) 
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where it  denotes the monetary transfer paid (if positive) or received (if negative) 







it We write numeraire consumption in nation 
i  as i i ix w t e   , .4,...,1i  
The payoff for the income-transfer agency in the GC is








i uuuuuu   
  where   2 21 ,i i i i iu w t e b ce a sg       .4,...,1i
 
  
Having observed the nations’ choices of energy consumption in the first stage 




gae as given, the income-transfer agency in the 
second stage of the game chooses  
4,...,1ii
t  to maximize  4321 ,,, uuuu , 



































      (19a)  
 
  
















       (19b)  
 
  















      (19c) 
 
  















      (19d) 
Plugging equations (19a) – (19d) into the national payoff functions imply that 


















   
  i i i
iii sgaecebw       (19e) 
In the first stage of the game, nation ,i ,4,...,1i chooses 0ie  to maximize 
(19e), taking energy consumption choices of all other countries as given. The first 
order conditions for an interior solution are  
,8212 sgaceb ii  ,4,...,1i           (20) 
which state that the transfers implemented among the four nations have induced 
each nation to internalize all continental acid rain externalities and climate change 
externalities when making decisions on energy consumption. Equations (20) 


































wuui         (21c) 
3.8 Setting 7: Continental and Inter-continental Environmental Agreements 
Suppose that there are two continental environmental agreements, one in 
North America and the other in Europe. The payoff of the income-transfer agency 
in North America is     020121, uuuuuu   and the payoff of the income-
transfer agency in Europe is     ., 040343 uuuuuu   Suppose that there is a 
trans-continental environmental agreement formed by nations 2 and 3. The payoff 
of the income-transfer agency in the trans-continental agreement is
    ., 030232 uuuuuu       
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As in setting 1, we let it  denote the monetary transfer paid (if positive) or 
received (if negative) by nation i under the continental environmental agreements 
and assume 1 2 0t t   and 043  tt .  Let 23t  denote the monetary transfer paid (if 
positive) or received (if negative) by nation 2 under the trans-continental 
agreement. The budget constraints of the representative consumers in the four 
nations are respectively 
1 1 1x e w t   ,               (22a) 
2 2 2 23x e w t t    ,              (22b) 
3 3 3 23x e w t t    ,              (22c) 
4 4 4x e w t   .               (22d) 
In the second stage of the game, having observed the nations’ choices of 
energy consumption in the first stage of the game and taking
 
 1 2 1 2, , , ,e e a a g  and 
 
32
t  as given, the income-transfer agency in North America chooses  1 2,t t  to 
maximize 
     ,11 0222222320221111 usgacebettwusgacebetw 
              (23a) 
subject to 1 2 0t t  . The first order conditions are    0 01 2 0u u u u     and
1 2 0t t  . Thus, 1 2u u  and 
         .,,211,, 2321223221123211 teettcebecebeteet      (23b)  
Taking
 
 gaaee ,,,, 4343  and  32t  as given, the income-transfer agency in Europe 
chooses  43,tt  to maximize 
     ,11 0224444022333233 usgacebetwusgacebettw       




subject to 043  tt . The first order conditions are     00403  uuuu  and
043  tt . Thus, 43 uu   and 
         .,,211,, 2343444233323433 teetcebetcebeteet       (23d)  
Taking  gaaee ,,,, 3232  and  32 , tt  as given, the income-transfer agency of the 
trans-continental agreement chooses 
23t  to maximize  
     .11 022333233022222232 usgacebettwusgacebettw 
             (23e) 
The first order condition is     00302  uuuu . Thus, 32 uu   and 
         .211,,,,, 233332222232323223 atcebeatcebettaaeet   (23f) 
Combining equations (23b), (23d) and (23f) yields 
 
      
















          (24a) 
 
  






















      (24b) 
 























       (24c) 
Plugging equations (24a) – (24c) into the national payoff functions imply that the 
four nations wish to maximize the average payoff function (19e). 
In the first stage of the game, nation ,i ,4,...,1i chooses 0ie  to maximize 
(19e), taking energy consumption choices of all other countries as given. The first 
order conditions for an interior solution are given by equations (20). Like the GC, 
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the coalition structure ({1,2},{2,3},{3,4}) leads each country to internalize all 
environmental externalities.  The equilibrium amounts of emissions are described 
by equations (21a) and (21b), and the equilibrium payoffs for the nations are 
given by equations (21c). Hence, both the GC and the international policy setting 
({1,2},{2,3},{3,4}) produce Pareto efficient allocations of world resources. We 
summarize the efficiency results in subsections 3.7 and 3.8 in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1. The subgame perfect equilibrium for the international policy game 
in which there is a Grand Coalition containing all four nations is Pareto efficient. 
The subgame perfect equilibrium for the international policy game with a 
coalition structure ({1,2},{2,3},{3,4}) is also Pareto efficient. The payoffs of the 
nations are the same in these two efficient international policy arrangements. 
4. Stability 
Similar to Silva and Zhu (2011), we find that there are many efficient 
international policy arrangements like ({1,2},{2,3},{3,4}) that do not require the 
establishment of the GC but successfully induce the nations to fully internalize the 
environmental externalities. In such arrangements, all nations’ payoff levels must 
be connected through coalitions with overlapping members which function as 
bridges between coalitions. For example, consider a coalition structure 
({2,3,4},{1,2}), under which nations 2, 3 and 4 form a trilateral trans-continental 
agreement and nations 1 and 2 form a bilateral continental agreement. The income 
transfers promoted in the trilateral agreement equalize the payoffs of nations 2, 3 
and 4. The income transfers implemented in the continental agreement equalize 
the payoffs of nations 1 and 2. Since nation 2 joins both agreements, all four 
nations’ welfare levels are equalized in equilibrium and every nation makes 
efficient choices of energy consumption to maximize global welfare.  
We define a coalition structure as a stable one if the payoff of every nation 
produced by the structure is no lower than the nation’s payoff produced by any 
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other coalition structure. Since all nations’ payoffs are equalized in an efficient 
international policy arrangement, all efficient policy arrangements yield the same 
set of national payoffs. Thus, there is no loss in generality in focusing our 
attention on one efficient setting to discuss the stability of all efficient policy 
arrangements. We shall examine the stability of setting 7 with the coalition 
structure ({1,2}, {2,3}, {3,4}).  
4.1 Stability Conditions 
Setting 7 is stable if no country or group of countries can be better off 
deviating from it. Comparing equations (7c) and (21c) shows that  
*1*7 uu  , if ;0s  and 
*1*7 uu  , for all  ,1,0s  .4,...,1i        (25) 
If there is no climate change damage, i.e., ,0s the four nations do not gain by 
moving from setting 1 ({1,2}, {3,4}) in which continental sulfur externalities are 
fully internalized through the two continental agreements to setting 7 in which the 
four nations maximize global welfare. If there are damages caused by the 
greenhouse gas emissions, i.e.,
 
 ,1,0s  setting 7 which induces full 
internalization of global climate change externalities and continental acid rain 
externalities produces higher global welfare than setting 1 which induces 
internalization of only continental acid rain externalities. Since all nations’ 
payoffs are equalized in both settings, every country is better off in setting 7 than 
in setting 1. 
Then we compare a nation’s payoff in setting 1 with the nation’s payoffs in 
other inefficient settings where it joins an IEA. Combining equations (7c) and (8d) 
yields 
*2*1
juu  , if ;0s  and 
*2*1
juu  , for all  ,1,0s  .2,1j       (26a) 
Without climate change damage, i.e., ,0s a nation in setting 1 achieves the same 
payoff as in setting 2 ({1,2},{3},{4}) in which it joins a continental coalition 
while the two nations in the other region stay as singletons. In both settings, the 
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nation and its neighbor in the same region internalize continental sulfur 
externalities and its welfare is not affected by the energy consumption choices 
made by nations in the other region.  If there are damages caused by the 
greenhouse gas emissions, i.e.,
 
 ,1,0s  the two singletons in setting 2 emit more 
greenhouse gas than in setting 1 in which they form a continental agreement 
according to equations (7a) and (8b). The global quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions in setting 2 is hence higher than in setting 1 as shown by equations (7b) 
and (8c). Thus a member of a continental coalition in setting 1 will be negatively 
affected if the other continental coalition dissolves. 
Comparing equations (7c) with equations (11c) yields  
,*3*1 iuu    ,4,...,1i for all  1,0s .          (26b) 
Due to the continental acid rain problems caused by sulfur emissions, the 
continental agreements make every nation better off relative to setting 3 ({1,3}, 
{2,4}) in which the bilateral inter-continental agreements fail to address regional 
acid rain problems.  
Combining equations (7c) and (12e) yields 
*4*1
huu  , for all  ,1,0s  .3,1h          (26c) 
A nation is better off in setting 1 than in setting 4 ({1,3},{2},{4}) in which it 
forms a bilateral agreement with a country in the other region and the other two 
countries act as singletons. In setting 4, the nation loses the benefits of reducing 
sulfur damages and suffers higher global greenhouse gas emissions as the two 
singleton countries increase their emissions of the greenhouse gas relative to 
setting 1 (see equations (7a), (7b), (12b) and (12c)).  
Comparing equations (7c) and (17f) shows that  
,*5*1 luu    ,3,2,1l  for all  1,0s .          (26d) 
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A nation is better off in setting 1 than in setting 5 ({1,2,3},{4}) in which it joins 
the trilateral agreement since one member of the trilateral agreement loses the 
benefits of reducing sulfur damages through a continental coalition.  
The results of (26a) – (26d) inform us that  
 ,,,,,max *51*41*31*21*1*1 uuuuuu    for all  .1,0s              (27) 
Thus, setting 1 with two continental agreements produces the highest level of 
welfare for a non-singleton nation among all inefficient coalition structures in 
which at least one coalition is formed. In the presence of continental sulfur 
externalities, selecting the country in the same region as a coalitional partner 
seems a natural coalitional choice for a nation considering joining an IEA. Setting 
1 where all nations do so performs in welfare terms only next to the efficient 
setting 7 for a non-singleton nation among all coalition structures in which at least 
one IEA is formed.   
To examine whether setting 7 is stable, we also need to compare a nation’s 
payoff in setting 7 and in settings in which it behaves as a singleton. Since each 
nation’s payoff in setting 7 is no lower than the nation’s payoff in setting 1, we 
check the stability of setting 7 by comparing a nation’s payoff in setting 1 and in 
settings in which it behaves as a singleton so that we can identify conditions under 
which setting 7 is stable and setting 1 is the next best choice for all nations. 
According to equations (7c) and (3c),  
0*1 uu    .1,0s             (28)  
In setting 0, all nations choose energy consumption Nash non-cooperatively. Each 
nation gets a higher payoff in setting 1 by internalizing continental sulfur 
externalities.  
We also find whether a nation’s payoff in setting 1 is higher than its payoff in 
a setting in which at least one IEA is formed and in which it acts individually 
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(settings 2, 4 and 5) depends on the magnitude of the damage-relativity index s . 
Equations (7c) and (8e) allow us to derive that 
*2*1
kuu  , ,4,3k  if ;0s          (29a)  
*2*1
kuu  , ,4,3k   1,0s  and ;873275.7c       (29b)  
*2*1
kuu  , ,4,3k if  1,00  ss  and .873275.7c        (29c) 
In the absence of climate change damages, i.e., ,0s  a nation prefers setting 1 to 
setting 2 ({1,2},{3},{4}) in which it stays as a singleton and fails to deal with 
regional acid rain problems. When there are climate change damages, i.e., 
 1,0s  , being a singleton in setting 2 allows a nation to free ride on the other 
region’s greenhouse gas emission abatement effort. The nation would compare 
the benefits of reduced acid rain damages produced by setting 1 with the benefits 
of higher energy consumption through free riding in setting 2. When energy 
consumption benefits are large, i.e., ,873275.7c  continental sulfur damages 
must be sufficiently large (i.e., the damage relativity index s must be smaller than 
a threshold value  0,1s  ) so that staying in setting 1 is more attractive to a 
nation than being a singleton in setting 2. For example, if ,4c we have
*2*1
kuu  , 
,4,3k  if and only if .647446568.00  ss By contrast, when energy 
consumption benefits are small, i.e., ,873275.7c the results in (29b) tell us that 
joining a continental environmental agreement in setting 1 is more beneficial to a 
country than acting as a singleton in setting 2.   
Similar reasoning applies to the comparison between a nation’s payoff in 
setting 1 and in setting 4 ({1,3},{2},{4}) as a singleton, and applies to the 
comparison between a nation’s payoff in setting 1 and in setting 5 ({1,2,3},{4}) 
as a singleton. Equations (7c) and (12f) tell us that  
*4*1




luu  , ,4,2l    1,0s  and ;207633.9c       (30b)  
*4*1
luu  , ,4,2l if  1,00  ss  and .207633.9c         (30c) 
Comparing equations (7c) and (17g) reveals that  
*5
4
*1 uu  , if ;0s           (31a)  
*5
4
*1 uu  , if  1,00  ss .              (31b)  
The result in (31b) informs us that regardless of the value of ,c  continental sulfur 
damages must be strong enough so that a nation prefers setting 1 to being a 
singleton in setting 5.  
By comparing equations (3c), (8e), (12f) and (17g), we also have the 
following results:  
 *54*44*240*54 ,,,max uuuuu  ,   ,1,0s               (32)  
which states that a singleton country obtains the highest payoff in setting 5 than in 
other settings. 














uuuuuuu     ,,0 ss  where  .1,0s             (33b) 
Hence, we have the following proposition:  
Proposition 2. There exists  10,s  so that an efficient coalition structure is 
stable for any .0 ss   Furthermore, setting 1 which features two 
continental agreements is the second-best coalition structure for any 
.0 ss   
Proposition 2 informs us that an efficient coalition structure produces the 
highest payoff for every nation than any other inefficient coalition structures, 
including coalition structures that feature singletons. This is remarkable because 
no nation has an incentive to be a stand-alone nation! The condition for stability is 
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that continental sulfur damages must be sufficiently high relative to climate 
change damages. When nations care about both climate change and regional 
transnational air pollution, large damages caused by regional transnational air 
pollution can prevent them from deviating from an efficient structure and free 
riding on the efforts of other countries to reduce climate change. Therefore, our 
efficient structures can be stable even in the d’Aspremont stability sense because 
no single country would like to deviate when other countries keep their coalitional 
choices.  
It must be pointed out that this stability in the d’Aspremont sense cannot be 
achieved without taking into account the correlation between controlling 
greenhouse gases and air pollution. If continental sulfur damages are dropped 
from a representative consumer’s utility function and the nations only set policies 
to deal with greenhouse gas emissions, we find that a nation will see the payoff 
generated by the stand-alone case in setting 5 higher than the payoff generated by 
setting 7 and the nation will decide to deviate from setting 7 if it assumes the 
other three nations do not defect.
8 
4.2 Numerical Examples  
Table 1 shows some examples of combinations of the values of c  and s  that 
lead to stable and efficient coalition structures. Let us first look at the values of s
in the third row of Table 1. At each of the five values of ,c  we have 
*5
4
*1 uu    for 
any s  smaller than .s  The results in (27) – (31) tell us that for all  ,1,0s the 
payoff of a nation in setting 1 is higher than or equal to the payoffs of the nation 
in any other inefficient policy settings except in the singleton cases in settings 2, 4 
and 5, when energy consumption benefits are large, i.e., .873275.7c  We 
consider two such values of c in Table 1, namely, 5.2c and 4c . In these 
cases, continental sulfur damages must be sufficiently large so that staying in 
                                                          
8
 A formal proof is available from the authors upon request. 
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setting 1 for a nation is more attractive than being a singleton in settings 2, 4 or 5.   
For example, if ,4c we have
*2*1
kuu  , ,4,3k  if and only if
;647446568.00  ss  
*4*1
luu  , ,4,2l  if and only if ;8996544.00  ss  
and *5
4
*1 uu  ,  if and only if .030305785.00  ss  These results are consistent 
with equations (32), i.e., *5
4
*1 uu  ensures 
*2
4
*1 uu   and .*44
*1 uu  Thus, a nation’s 
payoff in setting 1 is higher than or equal to the nation’s payoff in any other 
inefficient policy settings when 4c  and .030305785.00  ss  Similarly, if 
,5.2c we have
*2*1
kuu  , ,4,3k  if and only if ;510395.00  ss  
*4*1
luu  , 
,4,2l  if and only if ;8120877.00  ss  and
*5
4
*1 uu  ,  if and only if
.028976604.00  ss  Thus, a nation’s payoff in setting 1 is higher than or 
equal to the nation’s payoff in any other inefficient policy settings when 5.2c  
and .028976604.00  ss   According to (27) – (31), we also find that for all 
 ,1,0s the payoff of a nation in setting 1 is higher than or equal to the payoffs of 
the nation in any other inefficient policy settings except in the stand alone case in 
setting 5, when energy consumption benefits are small, i.e., .207633.9c  We 
consider three such values of c in Table 1, namely, ,207633.9c 12c and 
16c . For the payoff of a nation in setting 1 to be also higher than the nation’s 
payoff in the stand alone case in setting 5 at these three values of c , continental 
sulfur damages must be sufficiently large, i.e., the damage relativity index must 
be smaller than 0.031617124, 0.031856082, or 0.032053861, respectively, as 
shown by the last three cells in the third row of Table 1.  
 Since *1*7 uu  for all  1,0s according to (25), every country will be better off 
in an efficient coalition structure than in any inefficient coalition structures if a 
nation’s payoff in setting 1 is higher than or equal to the nation’s payoffs in any 
other inefficient policy settings. No country or coalitions of countries will have an 
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incentive to leave an efficient setting to enter an inefficient one and an efficient 
coalition structure will therefore be a stable coalition structure. The values of s
below which *5
4
*1 uu  in the third row of Table 1 hence give us the range of s
values at which an efficient coalition structure is stable and setting 1 is the second 
best choice for every nation at a given value of c .  
Consider now the values of s in the fourth row of Table 1.  At each of the five 
values of ,c  
*5
4
*7 uu   for any s  smaller than .s  The comparison results in (32) 
tell us if ,*54
*7 uu    a nation’s payoff in setting 7 is higher than or equal to the 
payoffs of the nation in any other inefficient policy settings in which it acts as a 
singleton.  The comparison results in (25) and (27) tell us that a nation’s payoff in 
setting 7 is higher than or equal to the nation’s payoffs in other inefficient settings 
in which it joins a coalition.  Therefore, at a given value of ,c the payoff of a 
nation in an efficient setting is higher than or equal to the payoffs of the nation in 
any inefficient policy settings at values of s below s  in the fourth row and an 
efficient setting is stable.  Since *1*7 uu  for all  1,0s  according to (25), in order 
to achieve ,*54
*7 uu  we do not need the level of continental sulfur damages to be 
as high as the level of these damages which leads to *54
*1 uu  at any given value of
.c  Hence, the threshold values of the damage relativity index below which 
*5
4
*7 uu   in the fourth row of Table 1 are higher than the threshold values of the 
damage relativity index below which  *54
*1 uu  in the third row of Table 1. And 
because of this, setting 1 is not necessarily the second best choice for every nation 
at values of s  below s  in the fourth row. 
For the second row of Table 1, since
*1*5 uul  , ,3,2,1l  for all  ,1,0s  in 
order to have ,3,2,1,*54
*5  luul the level of continental sulfur damages must be 
higher than the level of these damages which leads to *54
*1 uu  at a given value of
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.c Hence, the threshold values of s below which *54
*5 uul  , ,3,2,1l  in the second 
row of Table 1 are lower than the threshold values of s below which  *54
*1 uu   in 
the third row of Table 1. Since the values of s in the second row are smaller than 
the values of s in the third row and in the fourth row at any given c in the table, we 
find that at a given value of ,c for any s  smaller than s  in the second row, an 
efficient coalition structure is stable, setting 1 is the second best choice for the 
nations, and the payoff of a nation from forming a trilateral agreement in setting 5 
is higher than the nation’s stand-alone payoff in setting 5. 
 
We also see that as the parameter c  becomes larger in Table 1, the value of s
increases in each row of rows 2, 3 and 4, which indicates that the level of 
continental sulfur damages needed to overcome free riding incentives gets lower 
as energy consumption benefits decrease.  
5. Conclusions 
We examine the stability of international environmental policy schemes when 
sovereign nations set policies to control both greenhouse gas emissions and 
traditional air pollutants.  An international environmental policy scheme is 
defined to be stable if no country can obtain higher payoff under other 
international environmental policy schemes.  We assume that within a coalition, 
the member countries and the income-transfer agency play a two stage game. In 
the first stage, the member countries choose national environmental policy Nash 
non-cooperatively. In the second stage, the income-transfer agency implements 
transfers across the member countries based on a payoff function obeying the 
Nash bargaining form. In addition to the grand coalition which contain all 
countries in the world, there are a large set of efficient policy schemes in which 
all nations join at least one coalition, there is no coalition containing all nations, 
and all nations’ payoffs are positively connected through coalitions with 
overlapping member countries. We find whether the efficient policy schemes are 
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stable depends on the relative magnitude of damages suffered by a country caused 
by climate change and caused by regional transnational air pollution. Large 
regional transnational air pollution damages relative to climate change damages 
can deter free riding because a nation may find it worse off deviating from an 
efficient policy scheme and suffering higher transnational air pollution. 
To our knowledge, this is the first work in the IEA literature that 
simultaneously considers IEAs fighting climate change and controlling regional 
transnational air pollution. There is much scope for future work to improve our 
understanding of the interplay of controlling correlated regional and global 
pollution damages and the stability of IEAs. For example, we assume symmetric 
countries for simplicity and to highlight that the free riding incentive can be 
overcome when countries set both climate change and air pollution policies. An 
immediate next step would be to consider asymmetric countries. Other fruitful 
extensions are to consider bargaining costs in the negotiations that lead to the 
formation of IEAs and to examine settings with a large number of regions and 
countries. 
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Table 1: Examples of c  and s that result in efficient and stable coalition 
structures. 
c  2.5 4 9.207633 12 16 




*5 uu j   
3,2,1j  
0.012379 0.012802 0.013184488 0.01324963 0.013302265 




*1 uu   
0.028976604 0.030305785 0.031617124 0.031856082 0.032053861 




*7 uu   















Appendix A: Derivation of Equations (12a) and (12b) (For Online 
Publication) 
With   22121 eeaa  and   24343 eeaa  , equations (10e) for nations 
1 and 3 can be rearranged to yield 











 ,         (A1) 
and equation (2a) for nation 2 and equation (2b) for nation 4 can be rearranged to 
yield  











 .         (A2) 
Equations (A1) and (A2) indicate that  .3124 eeee   Substituting 
3124 eeee   into equation (A1) results in   02 31  eec , which implies 1 3e e
since 0c . Plugging this result into either equation (A1) or (A2) yields 2 4e e . 
Hence,  1 22g e e  . Plugging  1 22g e e   into equation (10e) for nation 1 
and equation (2a) for nation 2, adding the implied expressions and solving for 
1 2e e  yield    scbee 12211221  . Combining this result with equation 
(10e) for nation 1 and taking into account that 1 3e e  and  1 22g e e   yield 
equations (12a); combining this result with equation (2a) for nation 2 and taking 
into account that 2 4e e  and  1 22g e e   yield equations (12b). 
 
